This paper focuses on the macro-economic impacts of changes in health provision via its effects on the labour market. The resource allocation issues have been explored in theory, by further developing the Rybczynski theorem and empirically, using a Computable General Equilibrium model for the UK. From the theory, changes in non-health outputs are shown to depend on socalled factor-bias and scale effects. Using the CGE model with added real-life complexities, a rise in the NHS budget is shown to yield overall welfare gains, which fall by two-third assuming health-specific factors. A nominally equivalent migration policy yields even higher welfare gains.
Introduction
The interactions between health care, health and the remainder of the economy are multiple and complex. On the one hand, changes in income impact upon the consumption and/or provision of health care and other goods, which affects the health of populations in terms of mortality and morbidity (illness). On the other hand, changes in health impact upon the well-being of populations, with associated consequences for labour market participation, productivity and income.
Developed countries have high living standards and levels of health, and so are thought to be in a state where the marginal contribution of health care to health is minimal and other factors, like changes in diet, lifestyle (drinking and smoking), environment and education, are more important in explaining variations in health.
1 This being said, many former sceptics of the contribution of health care to health are now willing to accept that, even after allowing for diet and lifestyle, health care does make a difference for specific conditions, such as cardiovascular disease. Apart from gains in longevity, medical care also enhances the quality of life through pain relief and increased mobility. The rise in medical costs partially reflects improvements in treatment quality enabling less drastic treatments and a more rapid recovery. 2 Nevertheless, the majority of developed country health care systems arguably fail to deliver specific medical services to a "satisfactory" standard, which is commonly attributed to limited financial means and inefficient use of resources. In the UK, pressures are visible, among others in terms of poor health outcomes for some diseases (such as cancer), poor quality of services, including long waiting lists and waiting times for certain treatments, and inequities in access and health outcomes. These pose significant costs on society, in addition to the cost of health provision. In future, health care costs are bound to rise with the prospect of an ageing population and advances in medical technology.
While the interdependencies between health care, health and the rest of the economy are now widely acknowledged, economic models which are used to assess these fail to incorporate the main channels through which interactions take place. The majority of empirical studies employ econometric analysis and usually conceal or ignore general equilibrium effects of changes in health and health care across sectors, factors, households 1 See Folland et al. (2001, Chapter 5) on the production function of health.
2 Wallace (2004) .
and their implications for the government budget. 3 The small range of computable general equilibrium (CGE) models that does exist is diverse in application area, the majority having a developing country context (commonly Basic Needs, Externality and HIV/AIDS models) 4 , an exception being Lee and McKibbin (2003) , which is a global model. While each of these strands of CGE literature has its own merits, most do not assess the endogenous impact of changes in health care provision on population health, the labour force and its impact on production, income and welfare over time in a (developed country) CGE setting.
5
Empirical studies typically fail to account for the main feature of rich and poor nations' health care systems, namely that they treat and (partially) cure people, i.e. improve their health, which not only makes them "feel better" but also enlarges the effective size of the working and non-working populations through increased working time and reduced deaths.
The latter group of "young" and "retired" people are an additional source of demand for health services (and other goods), so reducing the availability and/or level of treatment for the current work force and thus its effective size. Moreover, both groups of non-workers are usually recipients of transfers from the working population (e.g. state benefits for children, state pensions for the retired), with the associated distortions. At the same time health care systems use factors of production including labour, which have to be paid for and reduce the effective supply of workers available to the rest of the economy. It is in addressing this caveat that this paper seeks to make a contribution. By doing so, it is hoped to aid policy makers in their pursuance of improving health provision, population health, welfare and economic growth.
The analysis is novel in mainly two respects. The first contribution is in terms of international trade theory, by developing an extension of the standard Rybczynski Theorem from a low-dimension Heckscher-Ohlin model which casts light on some of the resource allocation issues related to the provision of health care. While there is a strong literature on 3 Econometric models focusing on multiple linkages between health, health expenditures and economic growth include Bhargava et al. (2001) , Bloom and Canning (2000) , Bloom, Canning and Jamison (2004) , Bloom et al. (2001 , Crémieux et al. (1999) , Ettner (1996) , Hamoudi and Sachs (1999) , Hitiris and Posnett (1992) , Jamison et al. (2003) , Knowles and Owen (1997) , Mayer (2001a,b) , Pritchett and Summers (1996) , Strauss and Thomas (1998) , Stronks et al. (1997) and Thomas (2001) .
4 Kouwenaar (1986) , van der Hoeven (1987 van der Hoeven ( , 1988 , Vianen and Waardenburg (1975) , Savard and Adjovi (1997) , Arndt (2003) , Arndt and Lewis (2000, 2001) , Arndt and Wobst (2002) , Dixon et al. (2004) , Kambou, et al. (1992) .
An exception is the Dixon et al. (2004) model of the impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic and health interventions on the Botswana economy.
endogenous labour supply models 6 , these have in the main been based on direct labour supply responses to higher wages. In this model, changes in effective labour supplies come from changes in the size of the health sector.
The second contribution is in terms of empirics, by developing a CGE model for the UK with an extended health care component. The effects on welfare of higher health provision come through two main channels: (a) the direct gain from increasing the "well-being" of the population, and (b) the indirect effects of an increase in the size of the effective (i.e.
"able to work") endowments of skilled and unskilled labour for use in non-health activities.
The CGE model is calibrated to a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for the UK for the year
2000 with considerable refinement in terms of sectors (distinguishing health care and its main input suppliers), factors (capital, skilled and unskilled labour) and household types (based on age and labour market participation of household members). Taking the UK, an archetype of a developed country health care system in which government provision via the National Health Service (NHS) and funding dominates, as a case study allows the modelling of current "rationed" health care policies. Specifically, the policies of increasing the health care budget under mobile factors and health care-specific factors and the immigration of foreign skilled workers at the current wage are contrasted with each other.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents an extension of the Rybczynski theorem where endowment changes are modelled via changes in health provision. Section 3 discusses the UK CGE model and SAM. Section 4 presents the results of the policies aimed at alleviating rationing. The final section concludes.
Effective labour endowments and the health sector: some low-dimension analytics
Consider a small open "Heckscher-Ohlin" economy, endowed with two types of labour, skilled (S) and unskilled (U) both subject to illness at given rates. There are four sectors ("uses" for factors): Goods 1 and are conventional tradables, is the non-tradable health sector treating the ill (modelled as adding value to the ill) and W is an artificial "waiting list sector". The waiting list records those who are ill and not yet (successfully) treated by the health sector and are so unable to work. We assume that health care is provided by the government and that its expenditure is determined politically (and so 2 H 6 e.g. Martin (1976) and Martin and Neary (1980) . exogenous to this model). The exogenous product prices determine the factor prices and hence skilled-unskilled labour ratios in the three production sectors.
Within the period concerned, certain numbers of skilled and unskilled workers become ill and so unable to work. However, the health service successfully treats all but and of these respectively (the loss of working time for those successfully treated is taken, for simplicity of exposition, as negligible). Accounting for factor use (paralleling the full employment conditions for conventional models) gives: Figure 1 shows a possible initial equilibrium. It is drawn on the assumptions that the health sector is the most skill-intensive sector and sector 2 is the least skill-intensive, that the incidence of illness is the same for both groups of workers H 8 , that the health sector allocates its output of health treatment in proportion to the numbers falling ill, and that treatment is equally effective across labour types.
7
We could equally well work in terms of the numbers of worker-hours lost.
8
There is evidence that the incidence of illness is higher in the low-income groups, but we ignore this for simplicity of exposition.
Figure 1: An initial equilibrium
The maximum possible endowments of skilled and unskilled labour are and U respectively. Measuring inputs into sector from the north-east corner of this box and inputs into sector from the south-west corner allows us to determine the equilibrium at point
A (where the production isoquants of sector 1 and 2, not drawn for simplicity, are tangential, with a slope equal to the absolute value of the relative wage of unskilled to skilled labour). In the sense that there is no ill health, and hence no need for health provision.
Figure 2: An example of an expanding health sector with unchanged endowments
The expansion of the health sector and the contraction of the waiting list change both the total and relative amounts of factors available to the two tradables sectors. It is convenient to decompose these into a "scale effect" (increasing the effective endowments of both skilled and unskilled labour due to improved health) and a "factor-bias" effect (changing the effective endowment ratio due to differences in skill-intensities between health and nonhealth sectors). Splitting the changes into the two components allows us to draw some insights from standard trade theory results. 10 Since the health sector is, in this example, the most skill-intensive sector, its expansion will lead to a reduction in the skilled-unskilled labour endowment ratio available to the rest of the economy, so that, on the basis of the Rybczynski theorem, the output of the relatively skill-intensive good (sector 1) will fall and the output of the other good (sector 2) will rise. This is the factor-bias effect, depicted in Figure 2 by the move from A to B. The scale effect, from B to C, shows the effect of reducing the amounts of skilled and unskilled labour on the waiting lists, i.e. increasing effective labour supplies, which in this example increases the production of both goods.
In the example of Figure 2 it is evident that the net effect is a contraction of sector 1 and an expansion of sector 2. However, it will also be evident that in general the effects on the tradables sectors depend on the ordering of factor intensities of the three production sectors and the endowment ratio, on the incidence of illness and on the provision and effectiveness of treatments for the two types of labour. For developed countries the available evidence suggests that the elasticity of effective labour supplies with respect to health care is small 10 These results have their origin in the seminal paper by Rybczynski (1955) .
(and less than one) so that scale effects are small, as in Figure 2 . 11 Hence, using the theory, and assuming that health care is relatively skill-intensive, we expect an exogenous increase in health expenditures to benefit the unskilled-intensive sector and harm the skilledintensive sector.
Whether the health sector is, in fact, more skill-intensive than all other sectors is an empirical question as is that of whether the incidence of illness and the provision and effectiveness of health care are both independent of labour type. In a multi-sectoral model with more than two factors, possibly health care-specific, and other real-life complexities the foregoing predictions are most unlikely to be wholly true. Nevertheless, these effects will still operate in the background and thus give a useful guide to the interpretation of the outcomes of such a model. 
The UK CGE model and SAM
The analysis is based on a comparative static CGE model of the UK. The SAM underlying the model has been constructed by augmenting the UK Input-Output Supply and Use
Tables for 2000, using data from the General Household Survey (GHS) for 2000-01. 13 The latter purpose-built GHS database is a valuable source of information for a range of socioeconomic characteristics of private households living in Great Britain, notably health and health care use data. A short outline of the model is given below, with special detail on health and welfare effects.
The CGE model has in most respects a standard structure, the novelty coming from the explicit modelling of the health sector, comprising public (NHS) and private health care, and its interaction with the rest of the economy through its differential impact across sectors, factors and household types (see Table 1 ). (exported) goods and transport and trade margins. In addition, the Armington assumption (Armington, 1969 ) is imposed on both production and consumption: goods produced domestically are destined for either the domestic market or for the export market, while consumers differentiate between domestic and imported varieties of the "same" good. Substitution and transformation elasticities are assumed to equal two in this model. 14 The government uses its revenue from employment, production and consumption taxes to finance a fixed expenditure on goods (health care, public administration and defence, and other services) and a fixed amount of foreign exchange at the exchange rate to accommodate the trade surplus. The remainder of its budget is spent on income transfers to households which adjust so as to maintain the government account balance. Households allocate the latter income and earnings from the supply of capital, skilled and unskilled labour to savings and consumption, assuming that only working households save. All factor and product markets clear through price adjustments. Equilibrium in the capital goods market requires that the value of total savings equals the value of total investments. With the exchange rate as numéraire and the trade balance fixed in terms of foreign exchange, investments are savings-driven so that the model closure is neoclassical.
Health provision effects:
We model the interaction between health care and effective labour supplies by the use of a non-participation rate for each type of labour. Nonparticipation can be interpreted as being on the waiting list, whereas participation implies employment in one of the sectors of the economy. The effective supply of factor endowments f by households , h hf FE , is specified in equation (5), and the waiting list for factor f by household , , is displayed in equation (6). waiting list is a fraction of total given factor endowments of household h ( hf F ), and is defined positively only for labour ( f l ∈ ) whereas capital is always fully effective and fully employed.
15
The fraction of people on the waiting list, the non-participation rate, is assumed to be identical across all households and is defined as a constant elasticity function of a health composite:
14 The majority of goods produced in the UK is traded with similar high-income countries and are of the same high quality so that substitution and transformation elasticities are reasonably high. At the multicommodity level elasticity values in GTAP version 5 (http://www.gtap.org) are around 2 to 2.5. 15 This does of course ignore the loss in effective capital when, for instance, machines break down.
However, the cost of repairing a machine is internal to the firm, and is assumed to be assimilated into the cost of capital services, whereas the repair (treatment) of ill workers is a cost to the state or to the worker's insurers. find that sickness absence varies by socio-economic characteristics. Typically, the higher the wage and the higher the level of responsibility involved in the job, the lower the absence from work. Illness-related absence from work is approximately 1.5 times higher for manual than that for non-manual workers. Assuming that the non-participation rate in the base year for unskilled workers is 1.5 times that of skilled workers and postulating an overall non-participation rate of 3.20% yields 0 η = 2.89% for skilled and 0 η = 4.34% for unskilled workers.
The waiting list elasticity parameter, ε , is set to 2 for both labour types, so that a 10% increase in health status leads to a 20% decrease in waiting lists. Given the remaining parameter estimates, this implies that the elasticities of effective (labour) endowments with respect to the health composite in the benchmark are 0.06 and 0.09 approximately for skilled and unskilled labour respectively. 18 These numbers are consistent with health care elasticity estimates of around 0.1 based on US data (Folland et al., 2001, pp.108-109) . The elasticity of effective labour supply with respect to the health composite is higher for unskilled labour due to the fact that a relatively higher proportion of the unskilled suffer illness, so that health expenditure's "leverage" is greater for this labour type. The results are tested for sensitivity to alternative values of the waiting list elasticities.
Welfare effects:
The effects on welfare of higher health provision are two-fold: it directly increases the "well-being" of the population and indirectly improves welfare by increasing the size of the effective (i.e. "able to work") endowments of skilled and unskilled labour for use in non-health activities. Accordingly, changes in household welfare are calculated from private household utility using the Hicksian equivalent variation, to which the benefits from changes in public good provisioning (including NHS care) are added. For linear homogeneous preferences, the equivalent variation for household h can be written as:
where and denote household utility and income respectively, and superscript 0 and 1 respectively refer to the equilibria before and after a particular shock occurs. 
18 These elasticities measure the proportionate change in the size of effective (labour) endowments of skilled and unskilled labour following a change in the health composite, and are calculated as 
Policies aimed at alleviating rationing in UK health care
We examine the effects of two types of policies which have identical implications for the nominal government budget on health care (the NHS budget), but differ in terms of their real budgetary impact due to differential price effects. Experiments 1 and 2 simulate the impact of an increase in government health expenditures assuming mobile and health carespecific factors respectively. The introduction of health care-specific skilled labour and capital in the second experiment provides an alternative specification more suited to the short run. The former type consists of mainly doctors and nurses (approximately 85% of skilled labour employed in health care) and the latter consists of buildings and land (approximately 90% of capital employed in health care), and both earn a health carespecific remuneration. Using the same model specification as in Experiment 2, Experiment 3 considers the alternative policy of importing foreign health care-specific skilled workers in order to mitigate the shortage of highly skilled workers in UK health care. Health carespecific skilled wages are maintained at pre-immigration levels so that domestic workers are not worse off as a consequence of the policy. The experiment is carried out using three alternative assumptions regarding the share of foreign worker income remitted abroad, adopting illustrative values of 0%, 50% and 100% respectively, which have differential welfare effects since remittances have to be compensated for by a rise in exports and/or a fall in imports so as to maintain the balance of payments. It is assumed that an equivalent of 10% of domestic endowments of health care-specific skilled labour takes up the offer to migrate to the UK, so that the government budget on health care has to rise by 11.64% (£6.267 billion) to maintain their wages to pre-immigration levels. This budget increase is taken as point of departure for Experiment 1 and 2. 20 Figures 4, 5 and 6 report values for Experiment 3 in the absence of remittances as the effect on healthrelated variables is negligible. Household equivalent variations in Table 3 may not add up to overall welfare changes due to small measurement errors. Experiment 1 -a rise in NHS expenditures: The additional NHS resources result in an increase in NHS provision by 11.64% and, via input-output linkages, increase the demand for and domestic production of pharmaceutical products and medical, precision and optical instruments. As a consequence health care, pharmaceuticals and instruments become slightly more expensive, which increases the costs to and hence reduces the size of private health care provision (by 0.4%).
Are these sectoral effects in line with the predictions from the theoretical model of Section 2? From the theory we expect that "on average" the relatively skill-intensive sectors (2, 5, 8
and 9 in Table 1 ) contract and the relatively unskilled-intensive sectors (1, 3, 4, 6, 7 and 11
in Table 1 ) and the health sector expand. 21 Unreported results reveal that most skillintensive sectors do contract, albeit mildly, but the pharmaceuticals sector (2) expands. This suggests that, following a rise in the health care budget and the consequent expansion of the 21 When there are many sectors in a Heckscher-Ohlin model, the Rybczynski Theorem becomes a "correlation". As Falvey (1994) states, "There is a tendency for an increase in those outputs using intensively those factors whose endowments have risen and a decline for others." Further uncertainty about outcomes in induced by the existence of intermediate inputs. The UK health sector is relatively skill-health sector, the increased demand for intermediate inputs from this sector outweighs the reduced availability of skilled labour relative to unskilled labour. Also, most of the unskilled-intensive sectors contract, apart from construction (6) and the medical instruments sector (3). The latter's expansion is much more pronounced and, as before, is due to the intermediate demand effect from the health sector, rather than the increased availability of unskilled relative to skilled labour. The predictions of the theoretical HO model thus do not seem to carry over to the applied CGE model, providing a strong argument for the use of the latter.
The increase in public health care boosts the health of unskilled labour, its participation in the labour market, and reduces its waiting list by more relative to skilled labour, as the former is affected primarily by changes in public health care, whereas the latter also responds to changes in private health care provision which is more costly and less available. The changes in (effective) factor supplies and sectoral factor demands result in a (minor) fall in unskilled wages, whereas skilled wages and capital rents rise slightly.
Despite the fall in unskilled wages, the increase in labour market participation ensures that all households' income from unskilled labour rises. The fall in income from state benefits, which follows from the balanced government budget, leads to reductions in income for working households with children, but relatively more so for pensioners and non-working households. Only childless working households, who own most of skilled labour endowments and rely least on government transfers, gain slightly. Adjusting private welfare losses for changes in public good provisioning (including gains from increased NHS provision) reduces welfare losses so that pensioners and non-working households lose, whereas working households gain. Nevertheless, in total welfare increases by £2.808 billion (a gain of 0.3% relative to the original level of welfare).
Experiment 2 -a rise in NHS expenditures in the presence of health care-specific factors: This simulation implements the same policy as in Experiment 1, but accounts for the fact that a large part of the labour and capital employed in health sector are, respectively, highly trained or highly specialised and therefore arguably specific to health care and immobile. Key findings are that, unsurprisingly, the presence of health carespecific skilled labour and capital constrains the production expansion of health care and related sectors. An 11.64% increase in the NHS budget leads to a rise in real levels of NHS intensive, though its skill-intensity is only just above the endowment ratio, so we would expect the provisioning of only 5.1%, the remainder of the budget being spent on higher wages of highly skilled doctors and nurses and capital rents, showing increases of 13.6% and 13.8%
respectively, and resulting in higher unit costs (and a contraction in private care) of 6.2%.
As a consequence, direct and indirect welfare gains are lower compared to the previous experiment. Non-working households and pensioners lose by more and working households gain by less, cutting the total welfare gain by 63%.
Experiment 3 -importing health care-specific skilled workers at the current wage: In the absence of remittances abroad, the specified rise in the NHS budget which is targeted towards the immigration foreign health care-specific skilled workers, yields a rise in real levels of NHS provisioning of 10.3%. This is less than in the first experiment since the wages of the domestic and foreign workers of aforementioned type are sustained at benchmark levels, thereby increasing the unit costs of the provisioning (and reducing although sign changes do occur for some variables, the impact of changing the respective elasticities upon overall welfare is negligible. The same cannot be said for the waiting list elasticities for skilled and unskilled labour, for which no reliable estimates exist. In the presence of increasingly strong skill-neutral health effects, the expansion of NHS care, although representing an immediate cost to society, yields substantial welfare gains in the long-run through increases in effective labour supply and production, and by enhancing the "correlation" to be low. tax revenue of the government which benefits both working households (in terms of wage income) and non-working households (in terms of income from state benefits).
Nevertheless, in Experiments 1 and 2 total welfare rises for relatively low values of the waiting list elasticity (boundary values of 0.379 and 0.493 respectively) and in Experiment 3 welfare gains are guaranteed, even in the absence of health effects, so that the main results continue to hold.
Conclusions
This paper seeks to determine the macro-economic impacts of changes in health care provision, whilst recognising the simultaneous effects of consequent changes in health on effective labour supplies and the resource claims made by the health care sector. The resource allocation issues have been explored in theory, by developing an extension of the standard Rybczynski theorem from a low-dimension Heckscher-Ohlin framework, and empirically, by developing a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model, calibrated to a purpose-built dataset for the UK.
Using the theory, the impact of an expanding health sector on the outputs of non-health sectors was shown to depend on the sign and magnitude of a scale effect of increased effective labour supplies and a factor-bias effect of changes in the ratio of skilled to unskilled labour. Given that effective labour supplies are relatively inelastic with respect to health care provision, factor-bias effects dominate so that an increase in health care provision, which is relatively skill-intensive, is "on average" expected to result in an expansion of the relatively unskilled-intensive sectors and a contraction of the relatively skill-intensive sectors. These predictions were generally not found to hold in the CGE model due to added-real life complexities, most notably the presence of intermediate inputs.
This is a strong argument for the use of an applied model in addition to a theoretical model.
The CGE model was used to examine two types of policies aimed at reducing rationing in UK health care which have identical nominal NHS budget implications, but differ in terms of their real budgetary impact due to differential price effects. These are: an 11.64% rise in the NHS budget under mobile and health care-specific factors, and a policy of importing health care-specific skilled workers at 10% of domestic endowments and at the current wage, under alternative assumptions regarding remittances.
The main findings are that the increase in the NHS budget, while drawing away resources from other non-health related sectors and its private counterpart, leads to an overall welfare gain through increased worker incomes and direct increases in population well-being. The presence of health care-specific skilled labour and capital reduces the overall welfare gain by 63%, as over half of the specified budget rise is absorbed by higher wages and rents.
This suggests the importance of tackling rigidities in the health sector. The shortage of highly skilled workers may in the short-term be addressed via the recruitment of highly skilled foreign doctors and nurses. This policy was found to yield the highest overall welfare gains, even if all foreign worker income is remitted abroad, since government transfers need to fall by less to finance the health care budget increase due to a rise in government tax revenues. This is not to say that this is also a desirable policy given that many migrant workers come from developing countries which need their own educated staff. Consequently, in the long-term increasing the number of medical school places may be a more suitable policy response. Although we have assumed a balanced government budget in which state benefits adjust, equity considerations would favour financing the increase in NHS provision by raising direct taxes. The sensitivity of the results to the elasticity of the waiting lists with respect to health care indicates the importance of ensuring that additional resources in health care are effectively employed, which is attainable by technical and administrative improvements in health care.
Directions for future research are mainly fourfold. Firstly, we would like to model longterm population processes (births, deaths, transitions from "young" to "working" to "retired") in a dynamic (overlapping generations) model so as to link our analysis with the issue of ageing. Secondly, we aim to improve the modelling of health-related gains in "well-being" using for example the literature on happiness (Clark and Oswald, 2002) .
Thirdly, we seek to increase the level of disaggregation in health care in terms of, for example, types of treatments and care so as to assess the allocative efficiency of current spending, and types of health care staff and equipment to allow for differential substitution between them. Finally, we intend to model the impact of an epidemic, such as influenza, in order to test the ability of the UK health care system to cope with a disease outbreak.
